We propose analyzing conditional reasoning by appeal to a notion of intervention on a simulation program, formalizing and subsuming a number of approaches to conditional thinking in the recent AI literature. Our main results include a series of axiomatizations, allowing comparison between this framework and existing frameworks (normality-ordering models, causal structural equation models), and a complexity result establishing NP-completeness of the satisfiability problem. Perhaps surprisingly, some of the basic logical principles common to all existing approaches are invalidated in our causal simulation approach. We suggest that this additional flexibility is important in modeling some intuitive examples.
Introduction and Motivation
Much of intelligent action and reasoning involves assessing what would occur (or would have occurred) under various non-actual conditions. Such hypothetical and counterfactual (broadly, subjunctive) conditionals are bound up with central topics in artificial intelligence, including prediction, explanation, causal reasoning, and decision making. It is thus for good reason that AI researchers have focused a great deal of attention on conditional reasoning (see, e.g., [Ginsberg, 1986; Delgrande, 1998; Friedman et al., 2000; Pearl, 2009; Bottou et al., 2013] , among many others).
Two broad approaches to subjunctive conditionals have been especially salient in the literature. The first, originating in philosophy [Stalnaker, 1968; Lewis, 1973] , takes as basic a "similarity" or "normality" ordering on possibilities, and evaluates a claim 'if ϕ then ψ' by asking whether ψ is true in (e.g., all) the most normal ϕ possibilities. The second approach, associated with the work of Judea Pearl, takes as basic a causal "structural equation" model (SEM), and evaluates conditionals according to a defined notion of intervention on the model. These two approaches are in some technical and conceptual respects compatible [Pearl, 2009] , though they can also be shown to conflict on some basic logical matters [Halpern, 2013] . Both capture important intuitions about conditional reasoning, and both have enjoyed successful applications in AI research.
In this article we propose a third approach to conditionals, which captures a different intuition, and which can already be seen as implicit in a growing body of work in AI, as well as in cognitive science. This approach takes as basic the notion of a simulation model, that is, a program for simulating the transformation from one state of the world to another, or for building up or generating a world from a partial description of it. Simulation models have been of interest since the earliest days of AI [Newell and Simon, 1961] . A recent tradition, coming out of work on statistical relational models, has proposed building complex generative models using rich and expressive programming languages, typically also incorporating probability (e.g., [Pfeffer and Koller, 2000; Milch et al., 2005; Goodman et al., 2008; de Raedt and Kimmig, 2015] ). Such languages have also been used for modeling human reasoning, including with counterfactuals [Goodman et al., 2015] .
Simulation models have an obvious causal (and more general dependence) structure, and it is natural to link conditionals with this very structure. We can assess a claim 'if ϕ then ψ' by intervening on the program to ensure that ϕ holds true throughout the simulation, and asking whether ψ holds upon termination. This is conceptually different from the role of intervention in structural equation models, where the postintervention operation is to find solutions to the manipulated system of equations. As we shall see, this conceptual difference has fundamental logical ramifications.
This more procedural way of thinking about subjunctive conditionals enjoys various advantages. First, there is empirical evidence suggesting that human causal and conditional reasoning is closely tied to mental simulation [Sloman, 2005] . Second, there are many independent reasons to build generative models in AI (e.g., minimizing prediction error in classification; see [Liang and Jordan, 2008] ), making them a common tool. Thus, opportunistically, we can expect to have such models readily available (perhaps unlike normality orderings or even structural equation models).
Related to this second point, many of the generative models that are currently being built using deep neural networks fit neatly into our approach, even though we can often only use them as black boxes (see, e.g., [Mirza and Osindero, 2014; Kocaoglu et al., 2017] , etc.). We know how to intervene on these programs (i.e., controlling input), and how to read off a result or prediction-that is, we can observe what conditional claims they embody-even though we may not understand all the causal details of the learned model. Some authors have recently argued that certain kinds of counterfactual analysis in particular establish an appropriate standard for interpretability for these models [Wachter et al., 2018] .
Our contribution in this article is threefold: (1) we propose a general semantic analysis of conditional claims in terms of program executions, subsuming all the aforementioned application areas; (2) we establish completeness theorems for a propositional conditional language with respect to (four different classes of) programs, allowing a comparison with alternative approaches at a fundamental logical level; (3) we establish NP-completeness of the satisfiability problem for these logical systems. Before turning to these details, we explain informally what is distinctive about the resulting logic.
Conditional Logics
The literature on conditional logic is extensive. We focus here on the most notable differences between the systems below and more familiar systems based on either world-orderings or SEMs. We will be using a notation inspired by dynamic logic (also used by ), whereby [α]β can loosely be read as, 'if α were true, then β would be true.' Understanding the complete logic of a given interpretation can be of both theoretical and practical interest. In the causal setting, for instance, a complete set of axioms may give the exact conditions under which some counterfactual quantity is (not) identifiable from statistical data [Pearl, 2009] .
One of the bedrock principles of conditional reasoning is called Cautious Monotonicity [Kraus et al., 1990] , or sometimes the Composition rule [Pearl, 2009] . This says that from [A](B ∧ C) we may always infer [A ∧ B]C. While there are known counterexamples to it in the literature-it fails for some probabilistic and possibilistic interpretations [Dubois and Prade, 1991] and in standard versions of default logic [Makinson, 1994] -the principle is foundational to both world-ordering models and SEMs. By contrast, in our setting, holding B fixed during the simulation may interrupt the sequence of steps leading to C being made true. Here is a simple example (taken from [Icard, 2017] ): Example 1. If Alf were ever in trouble (A), the neighbors Bea and Cam would both like to help (B and C, respectively). But neither wants to help if the other is already helping. Imagine the following scenario: upon finding out that Alf is in trouble, each looks to see if the other is already there to help. If not, then each begins to prepare to help, eventually making their way to Alf but never stopping again to see if the other is doing the same. If instead, e.g., Cam initially sees Bea already going to help, Cam will not go. One might then argue that the following both truly describe the situation: 'If Alf were in trouble, Bea and Cam would both go to help' and 'If Alf were in trouble and Bea were going to help, Cam would not go to help'.
The example trades on a temporal ambiguity about when Bea is going to help, and it can be blocked simply by timeindexing variables. However, following a common stance in the literature Pearl, 2009] , we maintain that requiring temporal information always be made explicit is excessively stringent. Furthermore, in line with our earlier remarks about black box models, we may often be in a situation where we simply do not understand the internal temporal and causal structure of the program. To take a simple example, asking a generative image model to produce a cityscape might result in images with clouds and blue skies, even though a request to produce a cityscape with a blue sky might not result in any clouds. We would like a framework that can accommodate conditional theories embodied in artifacts like these.
Our completeness results below (Thm. 1) show that the logic of conditional simulation is strictly weaker than any logic of structural equation models (as established in ) or of normality orderings (as, e.g., in [Lewis, 1973] ). The conditional logic of all programs is very weak indeed. At the same time, some of the axioms in these frameworks can be recovered by restricting the class of programs (e.g., the principle of Conditional Excluded Middle, valid on structural equation models and on some worldordering models [Stalnaker, 1968] , follows from optional axiom F below). We view this additional flexibility as a feature. However, even for a reader who is not convinced of this, we submit that understanding the logic of this increasingly popular way of thinking about conditional information is valuable.
Prior Work. The notion of intervention introduced below (Defn. 1) is different from, but inspired by, the corresponding notion in SEMs [Meek and Glymour, 1994; Pearl, 2009] . The logical language we study in this paper, restricting antecedents to conjunctive clauses but closing off under Boolean connectives, follows .
Interestingly, prior to any of this work, [Balkenius and Gärdenfors, 1991] studied conditionals interpreted specifically over certain classes of neural networks, using a definition of "clamping a node" similar to our notion of intervention. They also observed that some of the core principles of non-monotonic logic fail for that setting.
(See in addition [Leitgeb, 2004] for further development of related ideas.)
Syntax
Let X be a set of atoms X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , . . . and let L prop be the language of propositional formulas over atoms in X closed under disjunction, conjunction, and negation. Let L int ⊂ L prop be the language of purely conjunctive, ordered formulas of unique literals, i.e., formulas of the form l i1 ∧ . . . ∧ l in , where i j < i j+1 and each l ij is either X ij or ¬X ij . Each formula in L int will specify an intervention by giving fixed values for a fixed list of variables. We also include the "empty"
is the L int -equivalent of ϕ if ϕ is a propositionally consistent, purely conjunctive formula over literals and ϕ ′ results from a reordering of literals and deletion of repeated literals in ϕ. For example, the L int -equivalent of ¬X 2 ∧ X 1 ∧ X 1 is X 1 ∧ ¬X 2 . Let L cond be the language of formulas of the form [α]β for α ∈ L int , β ∈ L prop . We call such a formula a subjunctive conditional, and call α the antecedent and β the consequent. The overall causal simulation language L is the language of propositional formulas over atoms in X ∪ L cond closed under disjunction, conjunction, and negation. For α, β ∈ L, α → β abbreviates ¬α ∨ β, and α ↔ β denotes (α → β) ∧ (β → α). We use α for the dual of [α], i.e., α β abbreviates ¬[α](¬β).
Semantics
We now define the semantics of L over causal simulation models. A causal simulation model is a pair (T, x) of a Turing machine T and tape contents represented by a state description x = {x n } n∈N , which specifies binary 1 values for all tape variables, only finitely many of which can be nonzero. Running T on input x yields a new state description x ′ as output, provided the execution halts. We say x |= X i iff x i = 1 in x. Satisfaction x |= ϕ of ϕ ∈ L prop is then defined in the familiar way by recursion. For X-atoms we define (T, x) |= X i iff x |= X i . Toward a definition of satisfaction for subjunctive conditionals, we now define an intervention (in the same way as in [Icard, 2017] ): Definition 1 (Intervention). An intervention I is a computable function mapping a machine T to a new machine I(T) by taking a set of values {x i } i∈I , I ⊆ N a finite index set, and holding fixed the value of each X i to x i throughout the execution of T. That is, I(T) first sets each X i to x i , then runs T while ignoring any write to any X i .
Any α ∈ L int uniquely specifies an intervention, which we denote as I α : each literal in α gives a tape variable to hold fixed, and the literal's polarity tells us to which value it is to be fixed. Now we define (T, x) |= [α]β iff for all halting executions of I α (T) on x, the resulting tape satisfies β. Note that for deterministic machines, this means either I α (T) does not halt on x, or the unique resulting tape satisfies β. The definition also implies that (T, x) |= α β iff there exists a halting execution of I α (T) on x whose result satisfies β. Having now defined (T, x) |= ϕ for atoms ϕ ∈ X ∪ L cond , (T, x) |= ϕ for complex ϕ ∈ L is defined by recursion.
Interestingly, as revealed by Prop. 1, model checking in this setting is difficult, while satisfiability (or validity) for notable classes of machines is decidable (Thm. 2). Proposition 1. If α ∧ β is propositionally consistent, then it is undecidable whether (T, x) |= α β.
Proof Sketch. Under a suitable encoding of natural numbers on the variable tape, the class T α = {I α (T) : T ∈ T }, where T is the class of all machines, gives an enumerable list of all the partial recursive functions, with T computably recoverable from T ′ ∈ T α . Moreover, H β = {T ∈ T α : T halts on input x with output x ′ |= β} is extensional and ∅ H β T α , so by the Rice-Myhill-Shapiro Theorem it is undecidable. If we could decide whether (T, x) |= α β, this would allow us to decide whether
A second limitative result is that we cannot have strong completeness (that is, completeness relative to arbitrary sets 1 The present setting can be easily generalized to the arbitrary discrete setting, indeed without changing the logic. See [Icard, 2017] . of assumptions), since by Prop. 2 we do not have compactness. On the other hand, our axiom systems (Defn. 3) are weakly complete (complete relative to finite assumption sets).
Proposition 2. The language L interpreted over causal simulation models is not compact.
Proof. Let f : N → N be any uncomputable total function such that f (n) = n for all n and consider Ω = {¬X n : n ∈ N} ∪ { X n X f (n) : n ∈ N} ∪ {[X n ]¬X m : m, n ∈ N with m = n, m = f (n)}. If (T, x) satisfies every ϕ ∈ Ω, we could compute f (n) by intervening to set X n to 1, and checking which other variable X m is set to 1. As f is total and f (n) = n, we could always find such m = f (n). So Ω is unsatisfiable. But it is easily seen that every finite subset of Ω is satisfiable.
Axiomatic Systems
We will now identify axiomatic systems (Defn. 3) that are sound and complete with respect to salient classes (Defn. 2) of causal simulation models, by which we mean that they prove all (completeness) and only (soundness) the generally valid principles with respect to those classes. Definition 2. Let M be the class of all causal simulation models (T, x), where T may be non-deterministic. Let M det be the class of models with deterministic T, and let M ↓ be the class of models with non-deterministic T that halt on all input tapes and interventions. Also let
Definition 3. Below are two rules and four axioms. 
PC.
Propositional calculus (over the atoms of L) RW.
From
[α]β → α β AX denotes the system containing axioms R and K and closed under PC and RW. AX det is AX in addition to axiom F, AX ↓ is AX in addition to axiom D, and AX ↓ det is the system combining all of these axioms and rules. Proof. The soundness of PC, RW, R, and K is straightfor-
† has at most one halting execution, so a property holding of one execution holds of all and F is sound. If
We use the standard names from modal and non-monotonic logic. The Left Equivalence rule [Kraus et al., 1990] , namely, in-
is not needed: since antecedents belong to Lint, they are never distinguished beyond equivalence.
M has at least one halting execution, so a property holding of all holds of one, and D is sound.
As for completeness, it suffices to show that any AX † -consistent ϕ has a canonical model M ϕ ∈ M † satisfying it. Working toward the construction of M ϕ , we prove a normal form result (Lem. 1) that elucidates what is required in order to satisfy ϕ (Lem. 3). We then define simple programming languages (Defn. 4)-easily seen to be translatable into Turing machine code-that we employ to construct a program for M ϕ that meets exactly these requirements. Lemma 1. Any ϕ ∈ L is provably-in-AX (and -AX † ) equivalent to a disjunction of conjunctive clauses, where each clause is of the form
and π ∈ L prop while β j , β k ∈ L int for all j ∈ J i for all i ∈ I and for all k ∈ K. We may assume without loss of generality
Proof. Note that provably in AX,
Use these equivalences and PC and RW to rewrite and get the result.
Given a clause δ as in (1), let S δ ⊂ L int be the set of L condantecedents appearing in δ. Each δ gives rise to a selection function f δ : S δ → ℘(L int ) (cf. [Stalnaker, 1968] ), obtained (not uniquely) as follows. To give the value of f δ (α), suppose that α = α k for some k ∈ K. If α = α i for some i ∈ I, then α ∧ β k ∧ j∈Ji β j is consistent: otherwise, [α] j∈Ji β j ∧ α β k implies α ⊥ which is AX-(and AX † ) inconsistent. Thus for some j ∈ J i , α ∧ β k ∧ β j is also consistent. In general α may be α k for multiple k ∈ K. For each such k, we find such a β j . We then set f δ (α) to the set of L intequivalents of the α ∧ β k ∧ β j , and set f δ (α) to the set of L int -equivalents of the α ∧ β k , if α = α i for any i ∈ I. The remaining case is that α ∈ S δ but α = α k for any k ∈ K; in this case, set f δ (α) = ∅.
Proof. In AX det , if α β 1 and α β 2 , then because [α]β 1 and [α]β 2 , and thus [α](β 1 ∧ β 2 ), we have α (β 1 ∧ β 2 ). In AX ↓ it is always possible to assume that for each i ∈ I there is some j ∈ J i such that α i β j appears as a conjunct. So no such α i will be sent to ∅.
Lemma 3. Let δ be a disjunct as in (1). Let M ∈ M. Suppose that M |= π, and for all α ∈ S δ that M |= α β for each
Proof. We show that M satisfies every conjunct in (1); satisfaction of π is given. For conjuncts
]β for any β whatsoever, so that such conjuncts are satisfied.
Definition 4. Let PL be a programming language whose programs are the instances of prog in the following grammar:
PL det will denote the same language except that PL det excludes choose-statements, PL ↓ is identical but for excluding loop-statements, and PL ↓ det is identical but for excluding both choose-and loop-statements.
A program in any of these languages may be "compiled" to the right type of Turing machine in an obvious way (loop represents an unconditional infinite loop). For the remainder of the article, fix PL † to be the programming language of Defn. 4 corresponding to the choice of M † . With the normal form result and suitable languages in hand, we proceed to construct the canonical model M ϕ = (T ϕ , x ϕ ) for ϕ. M ϕ need only satisfy a consistent clause δ as in (1). Intuitively, M ϕ will satisfy L prop -atoms in δ via a suitable tape state x ϕ (existent as δ and a fortiori π is consistent), and will satisfy each L cond -atom by dint of a branch in T ϕ , conditional on the antecedent, in which the consequent is made to hold. We now write the PL † -code of such a T ϕ . Suppose we are given δ, and that for each α ∈ S δ we have code HoldsFromIntervention(α) defining a condition that is met iff the program is currently being run under an intervention that fixes α to be true. Then consider a PL-program P ϕ that contains one if-statement for each α ∈ S δ , each executing if HoldsFromIntervention(α) is met. In the body of the if-statement for α, P ϕ has a choose-statement with one branch for each β ∈ f δ (α). The branch for each β consists of a sequence of assignment statements guaranteed to make β hold, call this MakeHold(β), clearly existent since each β is satisfiable. If f δ (α) is a singleton, this body contains only MakeHold(β); if f δ (α) = ∅, then this body consists of a single loop-statement. If T ϕ is the machine corresponding to P ϕ , and x ϕ is a tape state satisfying π, then M ϕ |= α β for each β ∈ f δ (α), as the program has a halting branch with MakeHold(β); also, M ϕ |= [α] β∈f δ (α) β as there are no other halting executions. If f δ (α) = ∅, then M ϕ |= [α]⊥, since under an α-fixing intervention the program reaches a loop-statement and has no halting executions. So by Lem. 3, we have that M ϕ satisfies δ. And thus ϕ. To see that M ϕ ∈ M † , apply Lem. 2: in AX ↓ , ∅ / ∈ range(f δ ) so we have no loops in P ϕ and M ϕ ∈ M ↓ . In AX det , we have no choose-statements, so M ϕ ∈ M det ; in AX ↓ det , we have neither loop-nor choose-statements, and M ϕ ∈ M ↓ det . But how do we know it is possible to write code HoldsFromIntervention(α) by which the program can tell whether it is being run under an α-fixing intervention? For any tape variable, we may try to toggle it. If the attempt succeeds, then the variable is not presently fixed by an intervention. If not, then the present execution is under an intervention fixing the variable. Thus, we first try to toggle each relevant variable. Let N be the maximum index i of any atom X i appearing in ϕ. Listing 1-call it IsIntervened(X i )-performs the toggle check for X i and records the result in X i+N . It uses X i+2N as a temporary variable and ultimately leaves the value of X i unchanged.
Listing 1: IsIntervened(Xi) X i+N := X i ; X i := ! X i ; X i+2N := X i ; if X i+2N = X i+N then X i+N := 1 else X i+N := 0 end; X i := ! X i ;
If IsIntervened(X i ) has already been run for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , HoldsFromIntervention(α) simply checks that exactly those variables appearing in α have been marked as intervened on, and that these have the correct values. If α is the L int -equivalent of ¬X i1 ∧. . .∧¬X i k ∧X i k+1 ∧. . .∧X in , code for HoldsFromIntervention(α) is given in Listing 2.
Listing 2: HoldsFromIntervention(α)
